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INCOME TAXATION
TAX TREATMENT ACCORDED SURRENDER OF
SHORT-SWING PROFITS
Cummings v. Commissioner
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 is part of
a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to protect the invest-
ing public by ensuring a fair and open market. 2 Specifically, section
16(b) requires a corporate insider 3 to surrender to the issuer any
profit realized by him on a short-swing transaction.4 It is firmly
established that the insider is permitted an appropriate tax deduc-
tion to reflect his 16(b) liability.5 The nature of this deduction,
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), provides in
pertinent part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer... within any period of less than six
months .. .shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer ....
2See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV.
385 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Cook & Feldman]. The authors, discussing the "sure thing"
speculation practiced by corporate insiders prior to the passage of § 16(b), point out that
§ 16, and particularly § 16(b), is Congress' answer to such insider abuse.
' The class of persons liable under § 16(b), commonly referred to as insiders, consists of
"[e]very person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum
of any class of equity security ... or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such
security .... Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
1 As described in § 16(b) of the Act, a short-swing transaction includes "any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security... within any period of less than
six months ...." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). An action to recover short-swing profits may be
brought by, or, in certain circumstances, on behalf of, the corporation. See id. In bringing the
action, the corporation need only prove that the insider's transactions occurred within the
statutory 6-month period. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943). According to the court in Smolowe, since the statute is essentially one of
strict liability there is no need to show an insider's intent to profit from unfair use of inside
information. 136 F.2d at 236. Additionally, the application of § 16(b) is not conditioned
upon actual misuse of inside information. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970). Employment of this objective standard has
been viewed as mandated by congressional intent. See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). See generally
Comment, Section 16(b): Judicial Inconsistency in Application of the Pragmatic Approach, 5 TEXAS
TECH L. REV. 731 (1974).
Courts have little difficulty in treating a 16(b) payment as taxable income to the
receiving corporation. See, e.g., General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434
(1955); Deitz, A Practical Look at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1, 36-37 (1974). As will be discussed herein, the more complex question has been how
the corporate insider should report his expenditure in satisfaction of a sale-purchase viola-
tion.
Initially, a 16(b) obligation was deemed a penalty. As a result, it was feared that
allowance of any deduction would frustrate the policy of the statute. See Lehman v. Commis-
sioner, 25 T.C. 629 (1955); Davis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 549 (1951); Dempsey v. Com-
missioner, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 936 (1951). In Marks v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 464
(1956), however, the Tax Court, in reconsidering its position, allowed a deduction for a
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however, is unsettled.6 In Cummings v. Commissioner,7 the Second
Circuit, facing the problem of whether the deduction should be
treated as a long-term capital loss8 or as an ordinary and necessary
business expense,9 held that in the case of a sale-purchase viola-
tion,10 the former treatment is appropriate."t
In 1959, plaintiff, Nathan Cummings, became a member of
the board of directors of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (MGM). In
connection with his election, in the same year, he purchased 51,500
shares of MGM's common stock. On April 17, 1961, Cummings
earned a substantial profit on the sale of 3400 of these shares,
which he reported on his 1961 income tax return as a long-term
capital gain. Approximately 5 months later, he repurchased 3000
shares at a price below that of his April sales. The Securities and
Exchange Commission notified MGM that Cummings was in appar-
ent violation of section 16(b) and that this fact would have to be
reported in its proxy statement.1 2 Although Cummings disputed
his liability, he remitted his short-swing profit to MGM, claiming
that he desired to protect his business reputation1 3 and that he
16(b) payment and expressed the belief that such a deduction would not frustrate public
policy. Case law which characterizes § 16(b) as a nonpenal, remedial statute supports this
view. See, e.g., Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). Thus, the Marks court seems to have correctly concluded
that allowance of a tax deduction would more closely reflect the intended purpose of § 16(b).
In light of Marks, the Internal Revenue Service promulgated Rev. Rul. 115, 1961-1 CUM.
BULL. 46, wherein it expressed the view that deduction of a 16(b) payment does not frustrate
public policy.
6 While Rev. Rul. 115, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 46, clearly permits the taxpayer to deduct a
16(b) payment, it fails to define the proper treatment of such a deduction, stating only that
"[tihe income tax significance of the capital stock dealings giving rise to the payment
determines whether it is deductible as an ordinary loss or as a capital loss."
7 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 943 (1975), rev'g 61 T.C. 1 (1973)
(rehearing), affg 60 T.C. 91 (1973).
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(4) defines a long-term capital loss as a "loss from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months ...."
9 Id. § 162(a) provides in pertinent part: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business ...."
,8 In a sale-purchase violation, a long-term capital gain may have been recognized when
the stock sold had been held for a 6-month period. Id. § 1222(4). This raises the question
whether the 16(b) payment should be treated as a long-term capital loss or as an ordinary
business deduction. In a purchase-sale situation this problem does not exist since the
securities must be sold within a 6-month period for a 16(b) violation to result. The income
realized must therefore be reported as an ordinary gain. Id. § 1222(1).
" 506 F.2d at 449.
12 Alleged violations of § 16(b) must be publicly disclosed in the corporation's proxy
statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(e), Instruction 4 (1975).
13 Cummings advanced several reasons in support of his contention that his business
reputation would be protected by settling the claim immediately. Not only would it be
embarrassing and dangerous to his position with MGM if litigation ensued, but mention of
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wanted to avoid any delay in the issuance of MGM's proxy state-
ment.14 Cummings treated this 16(b) repayment as an ordinary and
necessary business expense on his 1962 income tax return.1 5 The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, assessed a deficiency,
contending that the payment should properly be deducted as a
long-term capital loss. Cummings subsequently instituted an action
in the Tax Court seeking a determination that a payment to an
issuer made in satisfaction of a sale-purchase violation of section
16(b) should be treated as an ordinary and necessary business
expense.
The Tax Court upheld plaintiff's claim.1 6 The court reasoned
that since Cummings was in the business of being a corporate
executive, the 16(b) payment was necessary to protect his reputa-
tion and that of MGM and therefore qualified as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. The Commissioner, however, moved
for a rehearing based upon a subsequent case in which the Seventh
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. 17 Nevertheless, upon re-
consideration, the Tax Court reaffirmed its view, finding the
Seventh Circuit's interpretation not in conformity with established
tax principles.1 8
his 16(b) violation on the corporation's proxy statement would invite potentially damaging
publicity. 60 T.C. at 94.
I d.
", Although the long-term capital gain realized by Cummings was reported on his 1961
tax'return, the 16(b) payment which was made the following year was properly reported on
the 1962 return. See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951); Burnet v. Sanford &
Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931). The "claim of right" doctrine, established in North Am. Oil
Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932), gives finality to each accounting period. Thus, if a
deduction in future years becomes necessary, the prior year's tax return is not amended.
Instead, the deduction is applied in the year of payment. See, e.g., Healy v. Commissioner,
345 U.S. 278 (1953); Walet v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 461 (1958), aff'd per curiam, 272 F.2d
694 (5th Cir. 1959).
16 60 T.C. at 91.
17 Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
" 61 T.C. at I (rehearing).
In Lawrence v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713 (1957), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 258
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958), the Tax Court had discussed "what to do when an issue came
before it again after a Court of Appeals had reversed its prior decision on that point." 27
T.C. at 716. While the Lawrence court regarded an opinion of a circuit court highly persua-
sive, it did not consider an expression of one of the circuits binding on the Tax Court. The
basis for this view was that the Tax Court, as a court of national jurisdiction, strives for
uniformity. In light of the possibility of conflict among the circuits, such uniformity, it was
believed, could not be achieved if circuit court precedent were binding.
Also worthy of consideration, however, was the avoidance of unnecessary appeals. For
this reason, the Lawrence decision was criticized by many who contended that the Tax Court
should follow the rule of the circuit to which an appeal might be taken. See, e.g., Comment,
Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of Court of Appeals Precedents, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 717
(1957); Note, Controversy Between the Tax Court and Court of Appeals: Is the Tax Court Bound by
the Precedent of Its Reviewing Court?, 7 DUKE L. J. 45 (1957). In fact, some circuit courts found
any contrary policy extremely objectionable. See Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 46 (7th
1975]
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On appeal, the Second Circuit, with Chief Judge Kaufman
speaking for the court,1 9 reversed the holding of the Tax Court
and ruled that the 16(b) payment should be treated as a long-term
capital loss. In reaching its conclusion, the court was required to
wrestle with the confusing interplay of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Internal Revenue Code. It is submitted that the
position taken by the Second Circuit, while in accord with the
decisions of three other circuits2 ° and amply supported by se-
curities law, 21 reflects a strained interpretation of tax principles to
achieve a result not mandated by such tax precedent.
The Cummings court, relying primarily upon tax law and
finding additional support in securities law, expounded a two-
pronged argument. The tax justification for long-term capital loss
treatment was found in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner2 2 and United
States v. Skelly Oil Co. 2 3 In Arrowsmith, the Supreme Court enun-
ciated the doctrine that when income is taxed in one year at a
reduced rate, expenditures related to the earlier transactions
should be deducted at a comparable reduced rate.24 Thus, where
income derived from a corporate liquidation was initially reported
as a long-term capital gain, the subsequent payment by the tax-
payer of a judgment against the liquidated corporation was
deemed a long-term capital loss as opposed to an ordinary and
necessary business expense.25 Arrowsmith was followed and clarified
in Skelly Oil, where the Court held that the allowable deduction for
the refund of income, which when initially reported was given a
Cir. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Stacey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 237
F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam). In light of such criticism, the Tax Court ultimately
modified the opinion it expressed in Lawrence and will now consider itself bound by the rule
of the circuit to which its decision would be appealable. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).9 Judge Timbers joined in the Chief Judge's opinion. Judge Smith, concurring in the
result, authored a separate opinion.2 0 See Brown v. Commissioner, CCH 1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (76-1,
at 83,339) $ 9191 (10th Cir. Jan. 26, 1976), rev'g 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1300 (1973);
Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971);
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971),
rev'g 52 T.C. 170 (1969), analyzed in 1971 TOLEDO L. REV. 559. The material facts in these
cases are virtually identical to those in Cummings.
"1 See notes 30-32 and accompanying text inlra.
22 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
23 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
24 Since Arrowsmith, the general rule has been that the tax treatment accorded a transac-
tion occurring in one year may control the tax treatment accorded a related expenditure in a
subsequent year. See, e.g., United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969); Kimbell v.
United States, 490 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974); Commissioner v.
Adam, Meldrum & Anderson Co., 215 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913
(1955); Rees Blow Pipe Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 598 (1964), aff'd per ruriam, 342
F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1965); Estate of Shannonhouse v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 422 (1953).
25 344 U.S. at 8.
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27'/2 percent depletion allowance, should similarly be reduced by
the amount of the depletion allowance.2" In Cummings, Chief Judge
Kaufman justified his reliance on the Arrowsmith rule by reasoning
that the 16(b) repayment " 'had its genesis'" in the earlier sale and
therefore should be accorded tax treatment similar to that of the
reported gain.2 7 The Arrowsmith decision was prompted by the
desire to prevent the taxpayer from recognizing a "tax windfall"
through deduction of the expenditure at a tax rate greater than
that applied to the reported gain.28 It was the desire to prevent a
similar tax windfall which led the Second Circuit to treat Cum-
mings' 16(b) payment as a long-term capital loss. 29
In relying on securities law as additional support for its posi-
tion, the Cummings court cited its longstanding interpretation that
section 16(b) is intended to "'squeeze all possible profits out of
stock transactions' 30 in order to "remove the incentive for short-
term trading by corporate insiders." 3' To allow full deduction of
the 16(b) payment as a business expense would, in the court's
opinion, permit the taxpayer to profit from his illegal transaction
by the application of differing tax rates. Thus, the court concluded
that only by treating the liability as a long-term capital loss could it
effectuate the statutory policy.32
26 394 U.S. at 685-87.
27 506 F.2d at 451, quoting Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259, 261 (6th Cir. 1970).
The Cummings court observed: "The nexus between the § 16(b) repayment and the earlier
capital gains is apparent .... Thus, for tax purposes, [Cummings'] payment of $53,870.81
profit from the sale and purchase may appropriately be regarded as an adjustment to the
amount of the capital gain." 506 F.2d at 451.
2 Commenting upon its earlier decision in Arrousmith, the Supreme Court stated:
The rationale for the Arrousmith rule is easy to see; if money was taxed at a special
lower rate when received, the taxpayer would be accorded an unfair tax windfall if
repayments were generally deductible from receipts taxable at the higher rate
applicable to ordinary income. The Court in Arrousmith was unwilling to infer that
Congress intended such a result.
United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 685 (1969).
29 506 F.2d at 454. Avoidance of tax windfalls and possible double deductions is a basic
objective of tax law. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); Charles Ilfeld
Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934). Courts, dealing with the tax treatment of certain
expenditures, have consistently recognized this to be Congress' intent. See, e.g., Deputy v. du
Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
"0 506 F.2d at 452, quoting Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). To reflect the remedial nature of § 16(b), see note 5 supra,
rectifying a violation has been interpreted as requiring that the transaction is ultimately
profitless, not resulting in a windfall or penalty. See Cook & Feldman, supra note 2, at 385.
Essentially, this necessitates restoring the insider to the position he occupied prior to the
violation. See Lokken, Tax Significance of Payments in Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 GA. L. REV. 298 (1970); 23 DEPAUL L.
REV. 590 (1973).
11 506 F.2d at 452.3 2 1d. Deduction of the 16(b) payment as a long-term capital loss from the long-term
capital gain realized on the stock's sale nullifies the net gain. or loss (including any tax
19751
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Judge Smith concurred in the reversal, but rejected the Chief
Judge's conclusion that long-term capital loss treatment is proper. 3
Instead, in accordance with Judge Drennen's dissent in the Tax
Court,3 4 he urged a third alternative as the proper tax treatment.
Judge Smith argued that the court's reliance on Arrowsmith and
Skelly Oil as dispositive was erroneous. Whereas the payment
claimed as a tax deduction in those decisions was essentially an
offsetting expense related to an item previously included in in-
come,35 the 16(b) payment in Cummings, which arose from the
repurchase of the stock, was never included in plaintiff's income
and was unrelated to the reported gain from the original purchase
and sale.36 In the Judge's opinion, the transaction which gave rise
to the 16(b) liability, i.e. the repurchase of the stock, should have no
tax significance at all until the stock is sold. Accordingly, he rec-
ommended that the 16(b) payment be capitalized, thereby increas-
ing the basis of the repurchased stock and deferring tax conse-
quences until subsequent sale. 37
The continuing conflict between the Tax Court and the circuit
courts38 is understandable in light of the confusing interrelation
between the relevant tax and securities law provisions. While the
Tax Court's analysis may be justified solely on tax grounds, it
appears to ignore the intent of section 16(b). On the other hand,
the Second Circuit, by attempting to promote the purpose of sec-
tion 16(b), seems to have adopted a strained extension of Ar-
rowsmith. Judge Smith's third alternative is a logical compromise,
but finds little support in either tax or securities law.
It is well established in tax law that a payment made to protect
a taxpayer's business reputation from a business-related claim is
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 39 The
benefits) as a result of the 16(b) violation. Thus, the taxpayer will be restored to the position
he occupied prior to the offending transactions, thereby satisfying the remedial intent of
§ 16(b).
3 Id. at 453-54 (Smith, J., concurring).
34 61 T.C. at 4-5 (Drennen, J., dissenting) (rehearing).
35 See note 47 infra.
36 The amount of Cummings' 16(b) liability was determined in accordance with the rule
established in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943), by taking the difference between the price at which Cummings sold the stock and the
cost of the repurchased shares. Cummings recognized a gain on the sale only because the
stock increased in value during the period in which he owned it. Had the value of the stock
decreased and Cummings sold at a loss, while he still would have incurred 16(b) liability for
the difference between the sale and repurchase price, he would have recognized no capital
gain against which the 16(b) expenditure could be offset.
" 506 F.2d at 454 (Smith, J., concurring).3 5 See note 20 supra.
3, See, e.g., Helvering v. Community Bond & Mortgage Co., 74 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1935);
Pike v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 787 (1965); Old Town Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 845
[Vol. 50:367
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Second Circuit itself has said that "almost any trade or business will
give rise to claims, many invalid but some valid; resisting such
claims, paying judgments on some and settling others, is thus an
'ordinary and necessary' expense of 'carrying on any trade or
business.' "40 Therefore, in light of the Tax Court's finding that
protection of his business reputation was Cummings' purpose in
settling the 16(b) claim with MGM, 41 tax law would appear to
support plaintiff's contention.
Further, although less compelling, tax support for this view is
found in the "origin and character of the claim" test established in
United States v. Gilmore.42 There, the Supreme Court held that the
controlling factor in determining whether an expenditure is deduct-
ible as an ordinary and necessary business expense is the "'origin
of the liability out of which the expense accrues' or 'the kind of
transaction out of which the obligation arose.' ,,43 More specifically,
"the determinative question" is whether the claim arose "in connec-
(1962); Marks v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 464 (1956); Howard v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 157
(1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1953).
The critical question in determining whether a payment made to protect a taxpayer's
business reputation qualifies as an ordinary and necessary business expense is whether the
expenditure actually arose from the taxpayer's business. Thus, even if the expenditure is
necessary to protect the taxpayer's business reputation, deduction as an ordinary and
necessary business expense will not be allowed if the need for the payment arose out of the
taxpayer's personal life. See Nadiak v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1966); Lewis v.
Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958); Bonney v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 237 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957). For purposes of this analysis, a trade or business has
been generally defined as "all means of gaining a livelihood by work, even those which would
scarcely be so characterized in common speech." Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669, 671
(2d Cir. 1961) (citations omitted). As a result, a corporate officer or director may be deemed
to be carrying on a trade or business. See, e.g., Ditmars v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 481 (2d
Cir. 1962). But ef. Graham v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 14 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 326
F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1964) (totally inactive director not considered to be conducting trade or
business).
40 Ditmars v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 1962). So long as the claim
arises directly from the taxpayer's trade or business, courts have little trouble in characteriz-
ing expenditures, be they judgments, settlements, or attorneys' fees, as ordinary and neces-
sary business deductions. See, e.g., Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945);
Draper v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 201 (1956); Butler v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 675 (1951);
Great Island Holding Corp. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 150 (1945).
4, 60 T.C. at 95.
42 372 U.S. 39 (1963). In Gilmore, the Court disallowed the deduction as an ordinary and
necessary business expense of attorneys' fees expended by the taxpayer to protect his assets
from his wife's claim for alimony. The taxpayer attempted to justify the deduction by
arguing that since the property demanded by his wife was business property, its loss would
damage his business and his business reputation. Rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
[T]he origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was
incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer,
is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was "business" or "personal" and
hence whether it is deductible or not ....
Id. at 49 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the wife's claim for alimony had its
origin in the taxpayer's personal life and as such did not constitute a proper business
deduction.4 31d. at 47-48, quoting Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 494, 496 (1940).
1975]
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tion with [the taxpayer's] profit-seeking activities. ' 44 Although in
Cummings the 16(b) liability resulted from the taxpayer's violation
of a securities law, his status as a corporate director was an essential
element of the violation. The argument might therefore be made
that Cummings' expenditure was sufficiently connected with his
employment as a director of MGM to warrant treatment, under the
rule of Gilmore, as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 45
The Cummings court's reliance on Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil is
premised upon the existence of a nexus betweeen the 16(b) pay-
ment and the earlier capital gain. 46 Chief Judge Kaufman reasoned
that since the payment would have been unnecessary but for the
earlier sale, it should be regarded as an adjustment to the amount
of the gain. In both Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil, however, there was
more than a mere nexus between the relevant transactions. Indeed,
it may be argued that in each case the realization of income and
subsequent expenditure were, in effect, elements of one integrated
transaction, separated only by the arrival of a new year.4 7 Thus,
had they occurred in the same year, there would have been no
doubt as to their identical tax treatment, for the latter transaction
would have simply reduced the amount of income upon which the
initial assessment was made.
The relationship in Cummings between the 16(b) payment and
the earlier capital gain is arguably remote. First, it is questionable
whether Cummings acted in the same capacity in each transaction.
His recognition of the capital gain was as a shareholder of MGM,
while his incurrence of liability under section 16(b) was as a direc-
tor of the corporation. 48 Second, as Judge Smith and the Tax
44 372 U.S. at 51.
" Cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (attorneys' fees incurred by under-
writer in defending criminal prosecution for violation of fraud provision of Securities Act of
1933 deductible as ordinary and necessary business expense).
46 506 F.2d at 451.
11 In Arrowsmith, the taxpayers recognized a capital gain through liquidation of their
business. In a subsequent year, a judgment rendered against the liquidated corporation was
paid by the taxpayers as transferees of the corporate assets. The Court held that the
expenditure was related to the prior capital gain and must be deducted at the same tax rate.
344 U.S. at 8.
The situation was similar in Skelly Oil. There, the taxpayer was afforded a 27V2%
depletion allowance against its gross income. Several years later, part of the reported income
was paid out in settlement of claims brought by the taxpayer's customers. The Court held
that the allowable deduction for this expenditure should be reduced by the fixed percentage
of the depletion allowance, thereby according the reported income and the subsequent
payout equal tax treatment. Thus, Skelly Oil, like Arrowsmith, dealt with payment of an
amount previously included in the taxpayer's income.
The Arrowsmith rule was more recently followed and discussed in Kimbell v. United
States, 490 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
4, The distinct capacities in which Cummings acted were discussd by Judge Simpson in
the Tax Court. 61 T.C. at 2-4 (rehearing), citing Anderson v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1370,
1374-76 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 50:367
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Court each pointed out, the 16(b) payment was not, as in Ar-
rousmith, a return of an item previously included in income.4 9
Cummings' realization of income resulted from his original pur-
chase and sale, which, for tax purposes, constituted a complete
transaction. 50 The 16(b) payment was of the insider's profit on the
sale and repurchase, which, arguably a gain in the economic sense,
is decidedly not income for tax purposes. 5'
While the Cummings court made no attempt to rebut this criti-
cism of its reliance on Arrowsmith, such an attempt was made in
Anderson v. Commissioner, 5 2 wherein the Seventh Circuit arrived at a
result identical to that reached in Cummings. There the court ar-
gued that "[b]ifurcating the sale and payments smacks of artificial-
ity, and characterizing the sale-purchase occurrence as without tax
significance could only have been done in a vacuum. ' 53 It is submit-
ted, however, that this reasoning similarly "smacks of artificiality,"
for it fails to account for the distinction between the rationale of
Arrowsmith and the factual circumstances of a sale-purchase 16(b)
violation. Unlike the repayment in Arrowsmith, the 16(b) liability in
Cummings, the result of the taxpayer's violation of a securities law,
was not a repayment of an amount previously included in his
income. Thus, reliance on Arrowsmith as a basis for long-term capi-
tal loss treatment is a questionable extension of that doctrine.5 4
While Judge Smith and the Tax Court agree that Arrowsmith is
inapposite, they differ on what treatment the 16(b) payment should
be accorded. The Tax Court reasoned that since the payment was
made to protect plaintiff's business reputation, it was deductible as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. 55 The Cummings court
rejected this approach as contrary to securities law policy: "'With-
out good reason, we are unwilling to interpret the Internal Rev-
enue Code so as to allow this anomalous result which severely and
directly frustrates the purpose of Section 16(b).' "56 Judge Smith,
"See 506 F.2d at 454 (Smith, J., concurring); 61 T.C. at 2-3 (rehearing).
" For tax purposes, a gain or loss is recognized only upon a sale or exchange. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001, 1002.
5 1 See 506 F.2d at 454 (Smith, J., concurring).
22 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
53 480 F.2d at 1307.
" Since its first encounter with the issue of the tax treatment to be accorded the
surrender of profits resulting from a 16(b) sale-purchase violation, Mitchell v. Commis-
sioner, 52 T.C. 170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909
(1971), the Tax Court has consistently rejected the applicability of Arrowsmith notwithstand-
ing circuit court opinion to the contrary. See cases cited note 20 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
-1 506 F.2d at 452, quoting Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir.
1973).
The construction of apparently inconsistent statutes presents courts with serious prob-
lems. The majority view appears to be that the "proper approach is to ascertain the purposes
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on the other hand, suggested capitalization of the 16(b) payment by
adding it to the basis of the repurchased stock. He argued that
since the repurchase constituted the first half of a transaction with
independent tax significance, the 16(b) payment should have no
tax consequences until a gain or loss is realized by sale of the
rep~urchased securities.5 7 The Cummings court recognized that such
treatment might be preferable in certain circumstances, but, since
neither party advanced its adoption, refused to resolve the issue.58
Neither Judge Smith nor Judge Drennen, who first developed the
theory in the Tax Court, offered convincing arguments.
Perhaps some tax support for Judge Smith's capitalization ap-
proach can be extrapolated from the "origin and character of the
claim" test enunciated in Gilmore. Pursuant to this test, an expense
incidental to the purchase of an asset will be characterized as a
capital expenditure if it is intimately related to the taxpayer's in-
terest in the asset. Thus, it has been held that appraisal litigation, 59
negotiation costs, 60 and expenses necessary to compel the sale of
stock61 are all properly treated as capital expenditures. The propri-
ety of reliance on Gilmore, however, is somewhat doubtful, for in
most situations where capital expenditure treatment was deemed
proper, the expenditure related exclusively to a purchase transac-
tion.62 In contrast, the 16(b) liability in Cummings resulted from the
combination of a sale and subsequent repurchase. In addition,
Chief Judge Kaufman has suggested that scrutiny of Judge Smith's
approach under securities analysis reveals that capitalization may
be contrary to the intent underlying section 16(b).63 Since the
underlying both enactments, not to dispose of the problem by a mechanical rule." Fanning v.
United Fruit Co., 355 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Gamble v. Central of Ga. Ry.,
356 F. Supp. 324 (M.D. Ala.), rev'd, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Durand v. NLRB, 296 F.
Supp. 1049 (W.D. Ark. 1969). At least one court, however, has said that the controlling
statute should be that "provision more closely associated with the specific substance of the
controversy." Bowman v. Texas Educ. Foundation, Inc., 454 F.2d 1097, 1101 (5th Cir.
1972). Although the conflict presented in Cummings is more one of underlying policy than
statutory language, it would appear that the same considerations apply.
17 506 F.2d at 454 (SmithJ., concurring). Capitalization treatment has also been urged
by a number of commentators. See Lokken, Tax Significance of Payments in Satisfaction of
Liabilities Arising Under Section 16(b) othe Securities Exchange Act o]1934, 4 GA. L. REv. 298
(1970); 5 TEXAS TEC.H L. REv. 877 (1974).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1016(a)(l) provides that "expenditures, receipts, losses, or
other items, properly chargeable to capital account" may be used to adjust basis.
58 506 F.2d at 453.
. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970) (costs of determining value
of stock).
60 Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1970) (costs related to
settling claim for specific performance of contract for sale).
61 Ransberg v. United States, 440 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1971) (costs incurred in litigation
over buy-sell agreement between family members).
62 See, e.g., cases cited notes 59-61 supra.
63 506 F.2d at 453.
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provision is remedial, and not penal, in nature, deferring any
deduction until the repurchased shares are sold could work a
penalty not intended by Congress.
In the final analysis it appears that none of the three judicially
discussed alternatives offers an adequate solution to the problem of
determining the nature of the deduction to be afforded the type of
16(b) expenditure involved in Cummings. Although the long-term
capital loss treatment urged by the Second Circuit rests upon ques-
tionable tax precedent, it is suggested that the court's conclusion is
not entirely without sound support. Since the holding in Cummings
is in accord with three other circuits and is consistent with securities
law policy, it is urged that the decision not be disturbed absent a
more appropriate solution to this perplexing problem.
Jay Zeiger
